THE INFLUENCE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

ON THE LOCAL ORIGINAL RENEVUE AND PUBLIC

EXPENDITURE IN INDONESIA by Sulistyorini, Eni Jufriyah
 i 
THE INFLUENCE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
ON THE LOCAL ORIGINAL RENEVUE AND PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE IN INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirement for the degree of Magister Sains  
 
 
by 
Eni Jufriyah Sulistyorini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROGRAM STUDI MAGISTER AKUNTANSI 
FAKULTAS EKONOMI 
UNIVERSITAS SEBELAS MARET 
SURAKARTA 
2009 
 ii
THE INFLUENCE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
ON THE LOCAL ORIGINAL RENEVUE AND PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE IN INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirement for the degree of Magister Sains  
 
 
by 
 
Eni Jufriyah Sulistyorini 
SRN: S4307064 
 
 
 
 
PROGRAM STUDI MAGISTER AKUNTANSI 
FAKULTAS EKONOMI 
UNIVERSITAS SEBELAS MARET 
SURAKARTA 
2009 
 iii
THE INFLUENCE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
ON THE LOCAL ORIGINAL REVENUE AND  
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composed by 
Eni Jufriyah Sulistyorini 
S4307064 
 
 
 
 
Has been approved by the Supervisors 
On the date: September        , 2009 
 
 
 
Main Supervisor      Co Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
Drs. Djoko Suhardjanto, M.Com (Hons), Ph.D, Ak Drs. Sri Hartoko, M.B.A, Ak 
    NIP: 19630203 198903 1 006  NIP: 19610711 198703 1 001 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledge by 
Head of Accounting Master Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Doddy Setiawan, S.E., M.Si., IMRI., Ak 
NIP: 19750218 200012 1 001 
 
 iv 
The thesis has been approved to be a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
graduate of Accounting Master on: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2009 
Board of Examiners 
 
Examiner I Prof. Dr. Bambang Sutopo, M.Com., Ak …………….... 
 NIP.19520610 198803 1 002 
 
 
Examiner II Dra. Y Anni Aryani, M.Proff.Acc., Phd. Ak  ………............ 
 NIP. 19650918 199203 2 002 
 
 
Main Supervisor Drs. Djoko S, M.Com (Hons), Ph.D, Ak ..…………….. 
 NIP. 19630203 198903 1 006 
 
 
Co Supervisor Drs. Sri Hartoko, M.B.A, Ak   ..….…………. 
 NIP. 19610711 198703 1 001 
 
 
 
       Acknowledge by 
 
Director of PPs UNS                    Head of Accounting Master Program 
 
 
Prof. Drs. Suranto, M.Sc., Ph.D                Doddy Setiawan, S.E., M.Si., IMRI., Ak 
NIP. 19570820 198503 1 004         NIP: 19750218 200012 1 001 
 
 
 v 
DECLARATION 
 
 
Name   : Eni Jufriyah Sulistyorini 
NIM   : S4307064 
Study Program : Master of Accounting  
Concentration  : Public Sector Accounting 
 
I hereby sincerely state that the thesis titled “The Influence of Fiscal 
Decentralization on the Local Original Revenue and Public Expenditure in 
Indonesia” is my real masterpiece. The things out of this thesis are signed by 
citation and referred to in the references.  
 
        
Surakarta,     September 2009 
       As for state, 
 
 
       Eni Jufriyah Sulistyorini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thank’s for Almighty of Alloh SWT upon clemency and God’s guidance 
until this thesis completed. Sholawat and salam always poured out on to the 
prophet Muhammad SAW.  
Challenging as it is, getting an M.Si is a journey in my life. At the end of 
the journey and the start of my new career, firstly I appreciate and wish to thank 
for Minister of National Education of Indonesian Republic for the willingness to 
gives scholarship in the form of ”Beasiswa Unggulan” in order to complete my 
study in Master of Accounting Program, Faculty of Economics Sebelas Maret 
University. Secondly, I wish to thank for Dean of Faculty of Economics, Prof. Dr. 
Bambang Sutopo, M.Com, Ak. Thirdly, I would like to express my gratefulness to 
my supervisor, Drs. Djoko Suhardjanto, M.Com (Hons), Ph.D, Ak, for his wisdom 
and support throughout my studies. His dedication and generosity with his time, 
knowledge and experience greatly enhanced my thesis and challenged my 
research. His valuable guidance and support have made strong effort. I 
additionally wish to thank Drs. Sri Hartoko, M.B.A, Ak for his patience and 
encouragement have made my journey joyful. I also thank to him for providing 
exceptional guidance in my research and being a constant inspiration to me. I am 
also grateful to them for their valuable insights and advice. 
I extend my appreciation and gratitude to the head of Accounting 
Magisterial Program, Doddy Setiawan, S.E., M.Si., IMRI, Ak who facilitated my 
 vii
study.  I also owe a lot of thanks to Drs. Karsono, M.Si for his help for providing 
the toolkit necessary to analyze and to review my calculations. 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my husband, my sons, and 
friends for their love and support. My appreciation for my husband Tri Haryanto, 
S.Pd and my parents can not be articulated; they have always believed in me and 
unquestioningly supported me throughout my student career. And for my sons, 
Ahmad Wilfa Ahsana and Muhammad Nazih Al Amin, for their love and faith 
invaluable help as an inspiration. Without their patience and belief in me, I would 
not have been able to complete this journey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 Page  
TITLE ………………………………………………………………… i  
AGREEMENT ……………………………………………………….. ii  
APPROVAL …………………………………………………………. iii  
DECLARATION …………………………………………………….. iv  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT……………………………………………. v  
TABLE OF CONTENT………………………………………………. vii  
LIST OF TABLE …………………………………………………….. ix  
LIST OF FIGURE ……………………………………………………. x  
LIST OF APPENDIX ………………………………………………... xi  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ………………….. xii  
ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………….. xiii  
   
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION……………………………………… 1  
A. Background of the Study …………………………………….. 1  
B. Problem Statement …………………………………………… 5  
C. Research Purpose …………………………………………….. 8  
D. Research Contribution ……………………………………….. 8  
E.  Writing Systematic …………………………………………… 9  
   
CHAPTER II  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT…………………………………………………… 
 
11 
 
A. Literature Review ……………………………………………. 11  
1. Fiscal decentralization ……………………………….. 11  
2. Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia …………………. 18  
3. Revenue sources …………………………………….. 25  
4. Public expenditure and public accountability ………. 29  
5. Fiscal decentralization and public expenditure ………. 34  
 ix
B. Hypothesis Development …………………………………….. 36  
C. Conceptual Schema ………………………………………….. 46  
   
CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY…………………….. 47  
A. Research Design ……………………………………………… 47  
B. Determination of Population and Sample ……………………. 47  
C. Data Source and Data Collection …………………………….. 49  
D. Research Variable and Measurement ………………………… 50  
1. Independent variables ………………………………... 50  
2. Dependent variables ………………………………….. 50  
E. Data Analysis Method ………………………………………... 52  
1. Descriptive analysis ………………………………….. 52  
2. Multiple regression …………………………………... 53  
   
CHAPTER IV DATA ANALYSIS………………………………….. 56  
A. Data Description ……………………………………………... 56  
B. Statistical Results and Discussion ……………………………. 58  
1. Descriptive statistics …………………………………. 58  
2. Classical assumption test ……………………………. 60  
3. Data analysis and discussion ………………………… 62  
   
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND 
RECOMMENDATION……………………………………………… 
 
72 
 
A. Conclusion …………………………………………………… 72  
B. Research Limitation and Recommendation …………………. 73  
   
REFERENCES ……………………………………………………….. 75  
APPENDIX           
 
 
 x
LIST OF TABLE 
 
              Page 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................       59 
 
Table 2  Regression Test and Model of First Hypothesis ….….……….       63 
 
Table 3  Regression Test and Model of Second Hypothesis ..…………..       66 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURE 
                     
   Page 
Figure 1 Theoretical Schema of  Hypothesis Testing …….………………        46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
LIST OF APPENDIX 
    
              Page 
Appendix 1  Descriptive Statistics Analysis ………………………….……       83  
 
Appendix 2 The Result of the Classical Assumption Test of Data  
    before Outlier ……………………………….………………..        84 
 
Appendix 3 The Result of the Classical Assumption Test Using Log Data  
    before Outlier …….…………………………………………..       88 
 
Appendix 4 The Result of the Classical Assumption Test of Data  
    after Outlier …………………………………………………..        89 
 
Appendix 5 The Result of the Classical Assumption Test Using Log Data  
    after Outlier …………………………………………………..        91 
 
Appendix 6 Multiple Regression of the First Hypothesis ..…….…………..       95 
 
Appendix 7 Multiple Regression of the Second Hypothesis ….………….....      97 
 
Appendix 8 List of Regencies and Municipalities after Outlier …………….      99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Local Government Budget   APBD    
National Government Budget   APBN    
Balance Fund      BF (Dana Perimbangan)  
Special Allocation Fund   DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus)  
General Allocation Fund   DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum)  
International Monetary Funds  IMF    
Organization for Economic Cooperation  
and Development     (OECD)   
Others Revenue    OR (Pendapatan Lain-lain)   
Local Original Revenue   PAD (Pendapatan Asli Daerah)  
Government Regulation   PP (Peraturan Pemerintah)   
Regional Annual Budget Proposal RAPBD (Rencana Anggaran 
Pendapatan Belanja Daerah)   
Central government programs and projects DIP    
Revenue Sharing Funds   DBHK (Dana Bagi Hasil Kekayaan)   
Budget Realization Statement  LRA   
Legislation     DPRD    
Directorate General of Local and Central Financial Balance (Dirjen Perimbangan 
Keuangan Pusat dan  Daerah) 
Directorate General of Financial Balance and Budget (Direktorat Jendral 
Anggaran dan Perimbangan Keuangan)  
 
 
 xiv
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the influence of fiscal 
decentralization components on the public expenditure in Indonesia. This research 
used data of the local budget realization which consisting of balance fund, others 
revenue, local original revenue, and public expenditure that was obtained from 
financial statement regencies and municipalities in Indonesia. The selection is 
based on consideration that regencies and municipalities have similar 
characteristic of economic and geographic and also the result of the research 
would be expected to give a description of general condition in Indonesia’s local 
government. As for the data source was from Directorate General of Local and 
Central Financial Balance and also Directorate General of Financial Balance and 
Budget. It is related with information readiness in the financial report which is 
having completion data. Data analysis is done by two phases. That is                   
(1) descriptive statistic analysis, (2) hypothesis testing using multiple regressions. 
 
The results of this research proved significant positive influence of fiscal 
decentralization through component of balance fund in increasing original 
revenues while others revenue is not. Regarding with the public expenditure, both 
of balance fund and local original revenue positively influence on the public 
expenditure, while others revenue is not significantly influence. It indicated that 
there was dependence on receipt from central government through balance fund 
on regencies and municipalities in order to stimulate the increasing of local 
original revenue and improving public service in Indonesia. Therefore, 
decentralized system is expected to be better respond to local preferences and 
needs and to promote competition among local units in the provision of public 
goods and services. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Balance Fund, Other Revenues, Local Original 
Revenue, Public Expenditure. 
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ABSTRAKSI 
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menyelidiki pengaruh komponen 
desentralisasi fiskal pada belanja publik di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan 
data realisasi anggaran daerah yang terdiri dari dana perimbangan, pendapatan 
lain-lain, pendapatan asli daerah, dan belanja publik yang di dapatkan dari laporan 
keuangan kabupaten dan kota di Indonesia. Pemilihan ini berdasarkan pertimbangan 
bahwa kabupaten dan kota di Indonesia memiliki karakteristik ekonomi dan geografi 
yang hampir sama dan juga hasil dari penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memberikan 
kondisi umum pada pemerintah daerah di Indonesia. Adapun sumber data diperoleh 
dari Dirjen Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan  Daerah dan juga Dirjen 
Anggaran dan Perimbangan Keuangan. Hal ini berkaitan dengan kelengkapan 
informasi yang tersedia dalam laporan keuangan. Analisis data dilakukan melalui 
dua tahap, yaitu (1) analisis statistik deskriptif, (2) uji hipotesis dengan 
menggunakan regresi berganda.  
 
Hasil penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa desentralisasi fiskal melalui 
komponen dana perimbangan berpengaruh positif secara signifikan dalam 
peningkatan pendapatan asli daerah sedangkan pendapatan lain-lain tidak 
berpengaruh secara signifikan. Berkenaan dengan belanja publik, dana 
perimbangan dan pendapatan asli daerah berpengaruh positive pada belanja 
publik sedangkan pendapatan lain-lain tidak berpengaruh secara signifikan. Hal 
ini mengindikasikan bahwa ada ketergantungan pada penerimaan dari 
pemerintah pusat melalui dana perimbangan pada pemerintah kabupaten dan 
kota dalam rangka menstimulasi peningkatan pendapatan asli daerah dan 
peningkatan perbaikan pelayanan publik di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu sistem 
desentralisasi diharapkan dapat memberikan respon yang lebih baik terhadap 
kebutuhan daerah and dapat meningkatkan kompetisi antar daerah dalam 
penetapan pelayanan publik. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Desentralisasi Fiskal, Dana Perimbangan, Pendapatan Lain-lain, 
Pendapatan Asli Darah, Belanja Publik. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research discusses influence fiscal decentralization on the local 
original revenue and public expenditure in Indonesia. In this chapter, are 
explained backgrounds of the study, problem statement, research purpose, and 
research contributions.  
 
A.  Background of the Study 
The interest in fiscal decentralization is increasing among developing and 
develops countries. The reason is that fiscal decentralization is believed as an 
effective tool to increase the efficiency of public expenditures. Another reason is 
that fiscal decentralization is sometimes seen as a panacea for reaction to the 
failures of centralization system over past decades particularly in developing and 
transitional countries (Widhiyanto 2008). Over past decade, most of developing 
and transitional countries have either embarked upon or stated their intention to 
embark upon some types of fiscal decentralization as an engine of economic 
growth.  
Indeed, the pressure of decentralization has generally come from both 
internal and external drivers. From internal drivers, these pressures were 
supported by country’s historical and experiences, deepening democratization, 
increasing levels of public services, countries disintegration phenomena, 
responding to failure centralization system and so on. While from external drivers, 
 xvii
the pressure could come from country and/or institutional donors who have 
influenced the country recipient’s policies due to decentralization. 
World Bank (2003) states that in East Asian countries, a tendency towards 
decentralization is underway in almost every country while in Indonesia the ‘big 
bang’ decentralization program approach was applied in 2001. Widhiyanto (2008) 
says that the principle matter in implementation of local autonomy is the trust and 
the authority given to the region in managing and governing. Moreover, the most 
frequent problems in its territory are implementing local autonomy, expectedly 
that the region can be more democratic; independent; creative; and innovative, in 
managing and handling of its problem. Public services expectedly become better 
in gaining a social welfare (Yudani 2008). The implementation of local autonomy 
in principle consists of fiscal decentralization from central government to local 
government in Indonesia.  
Local autonomy has been done for eight years, with the purpose that the 
regions are capable to run their own governing based on initiation, creativity, and 
the active role of society. It aims to develop and to accelerate the realization of 
society welfare, its capability in increasing the competitiveness concerning with 
democratic principle; distribution; justice; potential; and region variety in 
Republic Indonesia. Hence, according to improvement of efficiency and 
affectivity of fostering local autonomy, local government is necessary to pay 
attention on the relation among governing composition and local government, 
potential and variety.  
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Local autonomy in Indonesia based on the Undang-Undang No. 22 year 
1999 juncto Undang-Undang No. 32 year 2004 about local government and 
Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999 juncto Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 
about financial balance between central and local with the decentralization 
government system have been already done effectively since January 1st 2001. 
Those Undang-Undang are to form a policy which is viewed really democratic 
and meet the truly government decentralization aspect.  
Hirawan (2007) says that the purposes of local autonomy program are 
accelerating economic growth and local development, decreasing inequality inter 
region and increasing public service quality in order to more efficient and 
responsive against of need, potential, and characteristic in each regions. These 
situations are reached through authority improvement and local government 
responsibility in direction to govern their domestic itself (Bastian 2006). 
Concerning the main mission of Undang-Undang No. 22 year 1999 jo 
Undang-Undang No. 32 year 2004 and Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999 jo 
Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 not only desire transferring the authority of 
development from central government to the local government, but also the most 
important is efficiency and affectivity of the financial sources.  Hence, it is needed 
a financial report that valid and reliable in order that can describe the local 
financial sources along with prestige analysis of the local financial sources 
management itself (Bastian 2006). 
Hirawan (2007) states that one of the main objective of decentralization 
implementation is to bring closer between government and society, therefore the 
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need of society to be understood by government. The expectation is policies done 
by government can meet the society demand through the economic development 
to reach the social welfare in line with increasing public service quality as an 
ending goal. This expectation based on assumption that the relation between local 
government as an agent and local society as a principal go on properly. 
Since January 1st 2001 had been occurred rearrangement of the relation 
vertically that is between central government, local government of province, and 
regencies and municipalities (Hirawan 2007). Rearrangement also occurred 
horizontally in central level (between executive, legislative, and judicative), and 
local level (between local government and legislation both of province and 
regency/municipality). The foundation of its decentralization execution is to meet 
democratization purpose and realize society welfare. It means that this policy of 
decentralization is aimed to compose public decision making process 
democratically and provide public services.  
Many literatures have pointed out that fiscal decentralization maybe 
dangerous in developing and transitional countries. In line with increasing better 
public services, the cost of service delivery also will increase. It causes regional 
governments expanded their expenditures while externalizing cost to others 
(Rodden 2002). Fiscal decentralization also could increase regional disparities 
based on traditional view. It was underlined the fact that central government’s 
power to redistribute income among regional governments is higher in the 
centralization system than in the decentralization system.  
 xx
In contrary, new theories argue that the benefits from decentralization are 
increasing efficiency and reducing regional disparity because by implementing 
decentralization government system, the regional government will be pursued to 
increase their own efforts in providing better public services in its region. Oates 
(1993) argues that there is much current interest in the potential contribution of 
fiscal decentralization to economic development. The increasing quality and 
quantity of public sector service may be seen as the result of economic 
development for particular region. Davoodi and Zou (1998) point out that fiscal 
decentralization is seen as part of a reform package to improve efficiency in the 
public sector, to increase competition among sub national government in 
delivering public service and to stimulate economic growth. Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization encourages efficiency public services and reduces regional 
disparities. 
So far, there are some arguments toward impact fiscal decentralization on 
public services spending. It makes this study more interesting to reveal whether 
fiscal decentralization influence upon public service expenditure. This study 
observes “The Influence of Fiscal Decentralization on the Local Original 
Revenue and Public Expenditure in Indonesia”. 
 
B. Problem Statement 
Basically, decentralization and specifically fiscal decentralization has aim 
to bring government and society closer. Therefore, it will increase the efficiency 
of the public sector, from transparent side and accountability of policy making to 
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consume of public fund in order to provide public services and improve local 
society welfare. Therefore the implementation of authority possessed by 
government that decentralization principle and democratization be demanded in 
base of government process of financing sources preparation to meet local 
government independence in finance their necessity. 
Based on the regulation of Undang-Undang No. 32 and 33 year 2004, 
there is a changing in the accountability and the responsibility of the local 
government from vertical of the central government become horizontal to the 
public through the legislation. Central government as a principal gives authority to 
the local government as an agent to manage of own goods and services 
preparation.  Mardiasmo (2002) stated that the management of the local 
government which has its accountability relies on the local government budget. 
The realization of the decentralization is the using of the resources economically, 
efficiently, fairly, and covers all area in order to reach the public accountability.  
The implementation of fiscal decentralization is expected to become and to 
use as one way to ease, so that it will not trapped in the condition of 
ineffectiveness, inefficient, and instability of macro economic. Fiscal 
decentralization is assumption as an important factor in answer of various 
problems. Bird (2002) emphasize on the importance of fiscal decentralization to 
improve economic efficiency, cost efficiency, and improving government 
accountability, although decentralization implemented by the similar pattern, can 
give different result depend on condition deviation among region.  
 xxii
Regarding with the decentralization, Slinko (2002) suggests that central 
government gives to municipalities targeted subsidies, it can directly control to 
use of the funds transferred to municipalities. He also suggested that in the fully 
decentralization local governments use public funds more efficiently, then 
decentralization is more optimal to give the opportunity of municipalities to 
decide upon the use of public funds independently since it would realize in the 
higher social wealth and lower inequality. This ensures that fiscal decentralization 
influences the output elasticity to public production. 
Relate to the fiscal decentralization in Indonesia, Purwantoro (2007) 
proves significant positive influence of fiscal decentralization in increasing 
original revenues and public expenditures. Meanwhile, Yudani (2008) finds that 
the results of the research supported positive influence of implementation of fiscal 
decentralization through component of transfers and own revenues but not with 
other revenues component. For development expenditure, only own revenue has 
positive influence on development expenditure, while transfers and others revenue 
has not. The other result shows that the regions with better readiness facing fiscal 
decentralization still have better economic growth during the implementation of 
fiscal decentralization (Adi, 2008). In addition Kuncoro (2007) states that the 
increasing of transfer is followed by increasing of spending growth while local 
original revenue only capable to finance local government spending at the utmost 
20%. Yustikasari (2008) also finds that either local original revenue variable and 
public allocation fund variable has a positive relation towards capital budget.  
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Based on the explanation above, the researcher proposes several problems 
in this research, which are:  
1.  Whether the fiscal decentralization which is prioritized by balance fund and 
others revenue influence on the local original revenue of regencies and 
municipalities in Indonesia. 
2.  Whether the fiscal decentralization through the proxy of balance fund, others 
revenue, and local original revenue influence on the public expenditure. 
 
C. Research Purpose 
According to the problem formulation, the purpose of this research is to 
provide empirical evidence about: 
1. The influence of fiscal decentralization components prioritized balance fund 
and others revenue on the increasing of local original revenue 
2. The influence of fiscal decentralization through the proxy of balance fund, 
others revenue, and local original revenue on the public expenditure of 
regencies and municipalities in Indonesia. 
 
D. Research Contributions 
This research is expected to provide contributions as follow:  
1. The result of the research is expected to be useful in understanding the 
influence of fiscal decentralization on the increasing local original revenue 
and public expenditure.  
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2. The result of the research is also expected to be useful for decision maker in 
local government, public sector institutions as one of matter consideration to 
improve decentralization policy. In order to the implementation fitted with the 
expectation in the using of the resources economically, efficiently, fairly, and 
covers all area, so the public accountability can be reached and government 
accountability can be improved. In practice, it could lead legislative and 
executive can make an accurate planning revenue and expenditure and it will 
be useful input to determine further policy.  
3. Moreover, the result of the research could be a reference for the academic 
related to the fiscal decentralization and could be a reference for another 
following research. 
 
 
E. Writing Systematics 
 
The writing systematic will be discussed in this study are: 
Chapter I :  Introduction 
To explain concerning with the background of the study, problem 
statement, research purpose, and research contributions. 
Chapter II :  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This chapter consist of theory which related to the fiscal 
decentralization and public expenditure. It will explain the 
literarture review, the previuos researches in developing of the 
research hypothesis and conseptual schema.  
Chapter III : Research Method 
In this chapter will be discussed related to the research design, 
population and sample, data collection, variable, and analysis 
technique. 
 xxv
Chapter IV : Data Analysis 
This chapter explains about analysis results toward data which used 
in this research and analysis results discussion. 
Chapter V :  Conclusion and Recommendation 
This chapter consists of research conclusion, limitation, and 
recommendation of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter will explain the literarture review, the previuos researches in 
developing of the research hypothesis and conseptual schema.  
 
A. Literature Review 
The literature review discuss about fiscal decentralization, fiscal 
decentralization in Indonesia, revenue sources, public expenditure, public 
accountability, and public expenditure. 
1. Fiscal decentralization 
While fiscal decentralization has several reasons for being adopted around 
the world, the common motive of the fiscal decentralization is considered to have 
the potential to improve the performance of the public sector. The theory of fiscal 
federalism holds that for certain public goods or services such as local public 
goods, providing them in a decentralized fashion can increase efficiency and 
accountability in resource allocation. It is because (1) local governments can be 
better tailored to the geographical benefit areas of the public goods, (2) local 
governments are better positioned to recognize local preferences and needs, and 
(3) pressure from inter jurisdictional competition may motivate local governments 
to be innovative and accountable to their residents (Oates 1972). 
Along with globalization, fiscal decentralization and the desire for local 
discretion and devolution of power is seen by the World Bank as one of the most 
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important forces shaping governance and development today. The World Bank 
Report (2000) points out that the decentralization interprets as a bargaining 
process between central and sub-nation government and in their report. The World 
Bank describes that one of primary objectives of decentralization is to maintain 
political stability in the face of pressure for localization. Then it is acknowledged 
that when a country finds itself deeply divided, especially along geographic or 
ethnic lines, decentralization provides an institutional mechanism for bringing 
opposition groups into a formal, rule-bound bargaining process. According to the 
Kee (2003) the definition of fiscal decentralization is: 
“the devolution by the central government to local governments (states, 
regions, municipalities) of specific functions with the administrative 
authority and fiscal revenue to perform those functions”. 
  
This definition shows that fiscal decentralization is a process of transferring 
the responsibilities and powers from the highest level of government to the lower 
tiers. Generally, the proper devolution of fiscal authority and expenditure 
responsibility is focus on issues of efficiency and equity, while public 
administration and political science scholars tend to focus on distribution of 
powers, responsiveness and accountability, and tax competition and coordination. 
The stabilization function involves the role of tax and spending policies and 
monetary policy in managing the overall level of economic activity. Therefore, the 
fiscal decentralization is an interest issue. 
There are three basic reasons (Kee, 2003) that is why the fiscal 
decentralization interest,  that is (1) central governments increasingly are finding 
that it is impossible for them to meet all of the competing needs of their various 
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constituencies, and are attempting to build local capacity by delegating 
responsibilities downward to their regional governments, (2) central governments 
are looking to local and regional governments to assist them on national economic 
development strategies, (3) regional and local political leaders are demanding 
more autonomy and want the taxation powers that go along with their expenditure 
responsible. Fiscal decentralization is now seen as part of a reform agenda of 
many nations to strengthen their regional and local governments to meet the 
challenges of the 21st Century. 
The traditional theory of public finance has made a strong case for a major 
role for fiscal decentralization. This case is based on an improved allocation of 
resources in the public sector and it has four basic elements (Oates 2006). First, 
regional or local governments are in a position to adapt outputs of public services 
to the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies, as 
compared to a central solution which presumes that one size fits all. Second, in a 
setting of mobile households, individuals can seek out jurisdictions that provide 
outputs well suited to their tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the 
decentralized provision of public services (Tiebout 1956). Third, in contrast to the 
monopolist position of the central government, decentralized levels of government 
face competition from their neighbors; such competition constrains budgetary 
growth and provides pressures for the efficient provision of public services. And 
fourth, decentralization may encourage experimentation and innovation as 
individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy; in this 
way, decentralization can provide a valuable “laboratory” for fiscal experiments. 
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Oates (2006) proposes a straightforward decentralization theorem that 
formalizes the basic efficiency argument for the decentralized provision of certain 
kinds of public goods. The theorem lays out a set of sufficient conditions for the 
decentralized provision of these goods to be Pareto-superior to a centralized 
determination of public outputs. The decentralization theorem stated that for a 
public good; the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the 
total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the 
good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or for the respective local 
government. It will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local 
governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform 
level of output across all jurisdictions. 
Moreover, Oates (2006) address that there are three issues relate with 
decentralization theorem, that is: the first, and perhaps the most straightforward, is 
the matter of inter jurisdictional spillover effects (or externalities). First, the 
theorem assumes that the benefits from the consumption of the public good are 
limited to those individuals within the jurisdiction where it is provided. There is 
no inter-jurisdictional spillover effects associated with the good. Note that it is 
still a public good in the sense that it is jointly consumed (i.e., consumed in the 
same quantity) by all residents of the jurisdiction, but it has no impact on the well-
being of those outside its borders. We are all familiar with the allocate distortions 
that typically occur when externalities are present, and this assumption simply 
rules out any such external effects. 
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Second, there are the closely interrelated issues of the mobility of 
individuals across jurisdictions and the precise nature of the public good. A 
second key issue in the theorem has to do with the precise nature of the public 
good. Often when treating public goods in general or those that are provided by a 
central government, the assumption is made that they are pure public goods in the 
Samuelsonian sense that an additional person can consume the output of the good 
without reducing the consumption of anyone else; in standard parlance, 
consumption is said to be “non-rival.” National defense is the ubiquitous example. 
Most of the literature in local public finance, however, has adopted a different 
conception of public goods. So called “local public goods” (as envisioned, for 
example, in the Tiebout model) are not pure public goods: they are subject to costs 
of congestion. Often the assumption is made that they are “fully congestible” (i.e., 
doubling the size of the group requires a doubling of inputs in order to maintain 
the level of consumption unchanged).  
All that the theorem requires is that whatever the nature of these public 
goods, the cost of providing a given level of output in a particular jurisdiction is 
the same, be the provider the central or local government. The third matter, one 
(which for good reason) has gotten much attention, is the assumption in the 
theorem that the central government is constrained to provide a uniform level of 
output across all jurisdictions. The third issue concerns the nature of central 
government provision of local public goods. It may help to be a bit more precise 
on this.  
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The decentralization theorem also suggests a straightforward way to 
generate a cardinal measure of the welfare gains from the decentralized provision 
of public goods. Fiscal decentralization can produce welfare gains where costs 
vary, since with given demands, differing costs will result in differences in 
efficient levels of output. The decentralization theorem assumes that cost 
functions for local public services are identical across all jurisdictions. It thus 
focuses solely on differences in demand as the source of welfare gains from fiscal 
decentralization. 
Regarding to the fiscal decentralization, Zorn (2008) views positive 
response that local governments can better respond to citizen preferences, assess 
willingness to pay, and target services to the right people. Because of this, 
services can be designed according to tastes and preferences of the particular 
locality; efficiency can be improved; resources can be saved without making 
anyone worse off; and also increased government responsiveness and 
accountability. Gurgur and Shah (2002) support that decentralization results in 
greater public sector accountability and lower corruption in unitary rather than 
federal countries. Term sound fiscal decentralization with regard to the extent it is 
conducive to macroeconomic stability. The term efficient fiscal decentralization 
refers to the extent it enhances microeconomic efficiency in the input and output 
mix of public service delivery. Clarity, transparency, stability and well-defined 
rules of the game are paramount for achieving accountability that efficient and 
sound decentralization requires (Dabla-Norris 2006). In general, institutional 
reforms that minimize adverse incentives and promote transparency, 
 xxxii
predictability, and accountability are the key to an effective decentralized system. 
Wildasin (1997) argues that ultimate impact of the decentralization on fiscal 
performance is highly dependent upon basic characteristics of the system of inter-
governmental fiscal relations such as transparency, accountability, and 
predictability. 
The other side, Zorn (2008) states that fiscal decentralization has negative 
effect, that are, (1) horizontal fiscal imbalance, (2) intergovernmental competition,  
(3) hindrance of ability to impose national standards. Horizontal fiscal imbalance 
can be happen due to different fiscal capacities among local governments; 
economic activity and tax bases vary across jurisdictions; the “haves and the have 
not”, so fiscal decentralization will result in inequities. Meanwhile, the 
competition is not always good, so competition for economic development results 
in reductions in taxes on businesses, reduction of environmental controls, and 
reduction in services. In fact, decentralization means differences in public service 
delivery within a nation and differences in how local governments are financed. 
So, this condition will become   hindrance of ability to impose national standard 
due to the service delivery by the various lower units of government is up to 
standard and the financing mechanisms result in reasonable outcomes.  
Recent studies argue that the conventional wisdom may remain true in 
developed countries, but it is not the case in developing countries. They hold that 
the conventional argument that decentralized provision of public goods will 
increase efficiency in resource allocation may not be applicable in developing 
countries (Prud’home 1995). Moreover, Rodden (2002) states in many literatures 
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have pointed out that fiscal decentralization maybe dangerous in developing and 
transitional countries. It causes regional governments expanded their expenditures 
while externalizing cost to others. Therefore, in light of the possible effects that 
depend on the institutional design of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
macroeconomic management and corruption, a key challenge for many transition 
economies has been to reap the economic benefits of decentralization while 
maintaining control over public expenditures and borrowing, restoring growth and 
improving accountability of local governments and officials to limit corruption. 
2. Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia 
Sidik and Kadjatmiko (2003) state that the general goals of Indonesia’s 
fiscal decentralization program are to help: (1) increase national allocate and local 
government operational efficiency; (2) meet local aspirations, improve overall 
fiscal structure, and mobilize local and therefore central revenues; (3) enhance 
accountability, increase transparency, and expand society participation in 
decision-making at the regional level; (4) mitigate fiscal disparities among 
regional governments and assure the delivery of basic public services to citizens 
across the country; (5) improve social welfare of Indonesians; and (6) support 
macro-economic stability. 
Implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia has been done in 
order to give wider responsibility and autonomy to local government. The 
application of decentralization in form of financial balance is expected to cover 
the realization of local autonomy, particularly in income side and expenditure 
sides since the implementation of decentralization in the beginning year 2001 
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based on Undang-Undang No. 22 year 1999 juncto Undang-Undang No. 32 year 
2004 about local government and Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999 juncto 
Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 about financial balance between central 
government and local government. Grayson (2000) state that there is no doubt that 
Indonesia is in a chronic state of crisis. However, the Indonesian nation-state is 
unlikely to disintegrate at the moment. This situation could change in the future if 
the authority of the Abdurrahman regime wanes, if the decentralization laws fail 
when implemented and if Aceh and Papua succeed in their bids to achieve 
independence.  
The basic principle of fiscal decentralization implementation in Indonesia 
is money follow functions. It means that transferring or delegating government 
authority with its budget consequence needed for doing its authority, until exist 
equilibrium between authority and responsibility which is transferred to region 
with its fund provision source (Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004).  Therefore, 
decentralization execution and government process necessary be supported by 
fund provision source from financial balance between higher level government 
and lower level government. Financial balancing is done through Balance fund 
mechanism that is revenue sharing among government level to running main 
functions of governing in decentralization sketch. 
According to the Undang-Undang No 33 year 2004, the principle of 
money follow function still have to be followed with capacity strengthening of 
human resource who will govern local financial in order to transferring of balance 
fund from central to local both in form of general allocation fund, special 
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allocation fund and sharing fund are not misused.  In the fiscal decentralization 
era, central government allocates resource in big amount to the poorer regions as 
an effort to balance disparity in Indonesia. Central government also give transfer 
support fund to the region in a shape of local central balance fund that is consist of 
general allocation fund that have purpose to overcome gap problem among 
regions (horizontal fiscal imbalance) and tax sharing fund and nature resource to 
overcome defect problem between central government and local (vertical 
imbalance) together with special allocation fund. Hence, fiscal decentralization is 
wished to overcome local defect problem in Indonesia.  
Within fiscal decentralization, the equalization of unconditional grants 
from Jakarta to the provincial and local government, including general allocation 
fund and revenue sharing funds, are intended to ensure fiscal sustainability in the 
context of macro-economic policy. Other purposes include correcting vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances, improving efficiency and affectivity of resource 
allocation and bringing the government closer to their citizens. Regencies and 
municipalities are expected be able to provide several public services. Thus 
general allocation should be considered as part of an equalization grant which also 
includes natural resource revenue and tax sharing. One cannot be separated from 
the other. Therefore, instead of formulating the amount of general allocation fund 
to be distributed in the very first instance, the central government should be able 
to estimate total amount of transfers, including general allocation fund, revenue 
sharing and special allocation fund. 
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The center piece of Indonesian fiscal decentralization is the general 
allocation fund that gives the full autonomy to local governments in spending and 
managing the grant. Instead of ad-hoc basis, the general allocation fund utilizes 
the formula to allocate the grant to all provincial and local governments in 
Indonesia. In most local governments, general allocation fund is basically their 
budget since its role is very dominant. This heavy dependence to general 
allocation fund creates disincentive for local governments in raising or 
intensifying the collection local original revenue. While excessive local tax 
collection and illegal charges might harm the local investment climate, the local 
governments still have to intensify the collection of legal local taxes and charges 
revenue up to the optimal level through better local tax administration system and 
law enforcement. 
Another new source of revenue for local and provincial governments is 
special allocation fund intended for the specific needs of local government or for 
special tasks assignment by the central government. However, it is not a central 
government priority at present. Special allocation fund could be considered as a 
matching grant for local government should they intend to develop infrastructure 
that could have positive impacts beyond their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the special 
allocation fund that theoretically should be devoted to handle the jurisdictional 
spill-over effects, ensure minimum service standard, and to pursue the national 
interest, is the best instrument to gradually devolve the line ministries power. 
With the scheme of special allocation fund that still involves the central 
government ministries and agencies, the local government will own the projects or 
 xxxvii
programs but they will be under the monitoring and evaluation from respective 
central ministries and central ministries will still have the decision on the types of 
programs or projects to be financed. 
The shift from central government programs and projects to special 
allocation fund could be designed in medium term perspective to make smooth 
adjustment both at central and local level. With greater special allocation fund, the 
local governments will have higher opportunity to develop the regions based on 
their plans and assessment. As many agree, the local governments know better the 
local needs than the central ministries. 
From fiscal sustainability point of view, this kind of shift will not affect 
the national government budget much since the transaction is basically transfer 
from development expenditure account to intergovernmental transfer account, in 
this case special allocation fund. Currently, there are requests from local 
governments to central government in allocating more than 25% net domestic 
revenue for the general allocation fund. This slight increase might not affect the 
national fiscal sustainability but the idea from one of influential ministry to 
increase the general allocation fund to be 30% of net domestic revenue might 
threaten the sustainability. That threat becomes more significant if there is no shift 
from central government programs to special allocation fund since the central 
government is forced to find additional revenue or to cut other types of 
expenditure. The move to increase the general allocation fund up to 30% of net 
domestic revenue will not affect the sustainability if accompanied by the shift 
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from central government programs to special allocation fund and by defining the 
better the devolution of authorities (Brojonegoro 2005). 
On the fiscal sustainability perspective, the central government has 
relatively managed the debt well so that the proportion for the intergovernmental 
transfer is higher in national government budget. A prudent and cautious national 
budget management is the key to success but the latest request to increase the 
general allocation fund portion might have to be observed carefully. As a result of 
the present general allocation fund and revenue sharing system, the vertical fiscal 
disparity might be lessened, but the horizontal fiscal disparity tends to widen, 
especially between Jakarta and some regencies in the oil producing regions, 
notably, Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan on the one hand, with other districts and 
municipalities in Indonesia.  
Another potential disruption of fiscal sustainability that relates to fiscal 
decentralization process is the disbursement of natural resources revenue sharing. 
The central government has committed to avoid the late disbursement program in 
the past that caused the large surplus at natural resources rich regions due to 
inability of absorbing the budget closed to the end of budget year. This late 
disbursement also caused the uncertainty in the local government cash flow 
management with few regions have to borrow from external sources to anticipate 
the incoming revenue. 
The central government, especially some line ministries, is still trying to 
be involved more in the local activities, and it is understandable given their almost 
absolute power in the past. The local governments might be still in the learning 
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process on how to rely on their own but they are learning quickly and given the 
limited budget, they can still manage the government administration relatively 
well. The amendment of Undang-Undang No. 22 year 1999 and Undang-Undang 
No. 25 year 1999 jo Undang-Undang No. 32 year 2004 and Undang-Undang    
No. 33 year 2004 should be treated as a significant improvement of 
decentralization process with the emphasis on better monitoring from central 
government and accountability at local level. On the fiscal side, there might be a 
problem of less than equal General allocation fund but it is improving albeit 
gradually. The central government also improves the natural resources revenue 
sharing disbursement that could neutralize the restless local governments.  
The new regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization policy is not only a 
matter of distributing funds and authority from the central to the local 
government; but also more importantly how to establish and develop democratic 
administrative and political institutions and good governance which should be 
able to stimulate local participation. Firman (2009) states that under the new 
regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization system, cities and regions in 
Indonesia face the challenge of how to improve their institutional development, 
while they are mostly inexperienced in self governing and are confronted with the 
lack of guidelines and operational procedures to implement the new regional 
autonomy leading towards good governance.  
The success of decentralization process will lie on the central government 
that designs the process and commits to the implementation. Although it is not 
visible, there is a tendency that decentralization is not one of priorities of central 
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government. The decentralization activities are already considered as routine 
activities. It might be a good one if all the process is perfect and smooth, but it is 
dangerous if everything is not in place yet. At the fiscal side, the central 
government still has to manage the fiscal sustainability that has effects on 
decentralization process and most importantly, Indonesians should avoid a large 
scale of economic crisis due to local government behavior in borrowing and 
managing their budgets as in the case of Brazil. 
3. Revenue sources 
Concerning with implementation of local autonomy and fiscal 
decentralization, local government is claimed to possess greater local financial 
independence. By the greater local financial independence level means that region 
is not depended on central government grant and province through balance fund.  
In the fact is many  region with the abundant nature riches, even though there are 
region have not possess the great nature riches but caused by economical structure  
managed well then tax potential can be optimalized until the region become rich. 
Although a lot of region both of naturally and economical structure left behind. 
According to that reason then transfer from central government in form of general 
allocation fund still given. For several requirements which can not be fulfilled by 
general allocation fund then government gives transfer in a form of special 
allocation fund.  
Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999 jo Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 
concerns with fiscal balance between central and regional governments, which 
would be accompanied with new responsibilities delegated to regional 
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governments under the law for administrative decentralization. As a result, by 
running Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 the total revenue received by regional 
government consists of local original revenues, fiscal balance funds and others 
revenue. 
a.  Local original revenue  
Based on the Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004, local original revenue 
defines as the income that sourced from pajak daerah (local tax), retribusi 
daerah (local retribution), pengelolaan kekayaan daerah yang dipisahkan 
(separated managed of the local resources) and lain-lain pendapatan asli 
daerah yang sah (others legal regional own revenues). So, local original 
revenues is composed of regional taxes, levies (retributions), and revenue 
from profit regional own enterprises and others legal regional own revenues 
which is purposed for giving local freedom to obtain fund provision in order to 
local autonomy implementation as a realization of decentralization. 
Local original revenue has an important role relate to the ability of local 
economic. Logically, if the local original revenue is increase then fund owned 
by local government is increase too. This increasing will be profitable for 
government to fulfill local needed. While general allocation fund becomes the 
center of attention for most of local governments, another serious issue in the 
local finance, the local original revenue, seems to be neglected.  
The Undang-Undang No. 25 year1999 and Undang-Undang No. 33 year 
2004 obviously do not give significant local taxing power since the Indonesian 
decentralization was designed to be the expenditure-led decentralization 
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financed by transfer. Comparison between annual growth rate of local original 
revenue during 1994-1996 periods and 2001-2002 periods indicated that prior 
decentralization growth (20%) is much higher than decentralization growth 
(5%). On the other hand, the central government is highly reluctant to give 
more local taxing power by transferring one or more of their taxes to the local 
government (Brodjonegoro 2005). 
However, after three years of decentralization, the aspiration of higher 
local taxing power emerged. One important indicator of regional autonomy 
should be the ability of the local governments to find their own sources of 
revenue and to reduce the dependence to the transfer. 
b. Balance fund  
The Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999 is became basis for new 
intergovernmental transfer arrangements as equality reflection revenue 
sharing. The balance fund consists of three components according to this 
Undang-Undang. The first is revenue sharing at certain portion of taxes on 
land and buildings, the transfer of land and buildings, and the net-tax revenue 
from the exploitation of forest, mining, fisheries, oil and gas. The second 
component is the general allocation fund, a block grant which is aimed to 
equalize the fiscal capacities of regional governments to finance their purchase 
expenditures. It is stated in the law that the amount of general allocation fund 
per fiscal year is at least 25 percent of the central government domestic 
revenue, and this amount should be distributed among local governments 
through formula that was designed with considering the regional needs and 
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potential capacity. The third component is the special allocation fund. 
Basically special allocation fund is also block grant that distributed to finance 
special needs that either cannot be included by the formula used in general 
allocation fund or categorized as national priorities and commitments.  
Grants from central government to regional governments can be 
categorized into three forms. First form is grant from the central government 
to be spent by the regional governments that integrated into the regional 
budget and registered into regional government’s account. The second form is 
grant from central government to be spent by regional governments, but not 
integrated into the regional budget and not registered in regional government’s 
account. The third form is funds that allocated by the lines ministries to 
finance development activities in the region. 
c. Others revenue  
Others revenue is composed by revenues from intergovernmental 
transfers such as grant, emergency fund such as funds used to cope with 
disasters, and saving from previous year. Others revenue is a local revenue 
source consist of grant revenue and emergency fund revenue. Grant is local 
revenue come from foreign state government, foreign institution, international 
institution, government, domestic institution or individual, both in a shape of 
foreign exchange, rupiah and goods and or service, include expert and training 
that is not necessary paid back. Emergency fund is a fund come from national 
government budget that is allocated to the region for natural disaster, 
extraordinary event, and or solvability. Others revenue aim to provide 
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authority to the local autonomy execution as transformation of 
decentralization suppose. Beside of that local revenue source, there is an 
alternative other financing for region to finance government process and local 
development in the form of loan both credit and bond. 
4. Public expenditure and public accountability 
In recent years, a confluence of factors has focused attention on the 
allocation of public expenditures. Macroeconomic imbalances in developing 
countries have underscored the need to cut spending and deficits (Pradhan 1996). 
In this case, governments have had to make difficult choices about where to cut 
spending, and how to allocate scarce resources to achieve societal goals for 
economic growth and poverty alleviation. Public expenditures in many developing 
countries are still financing the provision of private goods and services which can 
be provided in the private market-not only in industry and agriculture, but also 
within health, education and infrastructure.  
According to the Pradhan (1996), there are six elements which should be 
an integral part of an ongoing exercise to analyze the level and composition of 
public spending, that are: (1) the aggregate level of public spending and deficit 
must be consistent with the medium-term macroeconomic framework, yielding a 
sustainable deficit and public debt, (2) this aggregate spending should be allocated 
within and across sectors to maximize social welfare, including the impact on the 
poor. In this context, it is easier to analyze intersectoral allocations (or allocations 
within a sector), before dealing with complex comparisons of benefits a cross 
sectors in intersectoral analysis, (3) the role of the government versus the private 
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sector ought to be a principal criterion governing the choice of programs for 
public financing and provision, (4) the impact of key programs on the poor should 
be analyzed, including their incidence and total costs, to identify those which help 
achieve poverty alleviation objectives cost-effectively, (5) the input mix, or the 
allocations for capital and recurrent expenditures, should be analyzed in an 
integrated manner within programs and sectors to address the shortcomings of 
traditional capital-led budgeting with unsustainable recurrent cost requirements 
and the crowding out of non-wage operations and maintenance by wage 
expenditures, (6) the public expenditure review exercise should seek to build 
government capacity and ownership so that the exercise can be undertaken by the 
policymakers themselves as an integral part of their planning, budgeting and 
evaluation system.  
In sum, public expenditure should fund programs that make the most 
contribution to social welfare relative to what the private sector can do, rather than 
merely substituting for or event marginally improving upon private sector 
activities and outcomes. Public expenditure planning needs to be informed by a 
rich, disaggregated analysis of poverty drawing on a range of sources and 
methodologies (Fozzard and Foster 2001). This should allow decision makers to 
identify which groups within the population are poor, where the poor are 
geographically, the location of communities with worst social and physical 
infrastructure and the groups making least use of public services, all of which are 
important in targeting public interventions.  
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At the same time, public expenditure management has also moved 
upstream, recognizing that policy decisions are expenditure decisions and that 
system performance can only be assessed in relation to policy goals. Additionally, 
Fozzard and Foster (2001) state that in tandem with the new focus on 
performance, public expenditure management systems have also come to be 
viewed as a key instrument of governance. This requires that public expenditure 
management systems are not only transparent and accountable to parliament, but 
also involve citizens in decision making. 
At the paramount, the most desirable aspects of public expenditure are that 
public money be spent with a minimum of irregularities and wastage, and that 
such spending result in the maximization of benefits with the minimization of 
costs. Khan and Chowdhury (2008) conclude though not explicitly explored in the 
analysis, is that countries which combine political and civic freedoms with a high 
degree of decentralization which brings public institutions closer to the citizenry 
and creates conditions for greater civic engagement in public accountability 
achieve greater corruption control and ensure more efficient and equitable 
delivery of public services. 
Relate to the public accountability aspect, Boncondin (2007) cited on 
Khan and Chowdhury (2008) define that public accountability concerns the 
obligations of persons and/or entities entrusted with public resources to report to 
and be answerable to the public for the manner in which public money has been 
allocated, spent and utilized. From this definition of public accountability, it is 
clear that the public entities that utilize public resources have an obligation to 
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account for the way these resources are allocated, used and the results these 
spending have achieved. In other words, the main objectives of all public 
accountability initiatives are to ensure that public money is spent most 
economically and efficiently, that there is minimum of wastage or theft and finally 
that public actually benefit from public finance.  
Accountability of local government to its constituents is a pre-condition 
for successful decentralization. Without it, the efficiency gains from better 
matching local services with local preferences will fail to transpire. 
Decentralization did not just bring new accountability at the local level; it also 
changed the relationship between levels of government. In addition, Indonesia’s 
species of democracy adds another layer of complexity through the party system, 
central and local. Each of these accountability relationships is in the process of 
evolution, and manifests strengths and weaknesses. And while community 
demand and simultaneously response from the local executive and legislative, for 
public accountability has grown, variation across localities is large. 
 In the course of specifying the detailed distribution of functions across 
levels of government, the authorities have to decide whether to set standards of 
service provision for the decentralized functions. Minimum service standards are 
mainly justified by a government’s social objectives, including ensuring that each 
citizen of the country, no matter where he or she lives, should have the same 
access to basic public services such as basic education, health care, clean water, 
and minimum social protection. However, setting such standards involves a fine 
balance: if they are too restrictive, the gains from decentralization may prove in 
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difficult situation, and the local governments will be unable to exploit local 
circumstances. 
The standards should also be truly minimum standards, in order not to bind 
local government too much, and overburden the central budget. As a result, 
service delivery beyond the minimum standards could be provided by a local 
government’s own revenues, including by user charges. For instance, government 
could provide some minimum environmental services from general means, but 
beyond that minimum, locally levied pollution charges could serve to maintain 
water and air quality. 
In a unitary state such as Indonesia it is normal that the central government 
sets the standard for service delivery in the obligatory functions of local 
government. In the end, local governments are an instrument of the state to 
achieve its goals and objectives, and thus specifying what is expected of local 
governments is only natural. In addition, some understanding of what the regions 
are supposed to deliver in terms of services would promote local accountability. In 
fact, the head of the region is, according to government regulation 108/2000, 
accountable for achieving these standards. Thus, many heads of regions have been 
eagerly asking for standards, in order to be held accountable against those 
centrally set criteria, rather than against arbitrary standards set by the local 
parliament. Regions have been keen to obtain minimum standards for other 
reasons as well: the more standards they have to meet, the more money they 
expect from the central government. 
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5. Fiscal decentralization and public expenditure 
Decentralization may be driven by fiscal concerns to align responsibility 
for services with the level of government best able to manage and mobilize 
resources for them. One danger then is that the national government uses this as 
an excuse to off-load expenditure responsibilities onto jurisdictions without 
recourse to potentially inflationary financing. While this could lead to a greater 
willingness to pay more local taxes because citizens perceive a direct link between 
taxes and service quality. Decentralization can also be driven by a desire to move 
services closer to the people. But success depends on how decentralization affects 
relationships of accountability. If decentralization just replaces the functions of 
the central ministry with a slightly lower tier of government (a province or state), 
but everything else about the environment remains the same compact, 
management, and client power there is little reason to expect positive change. The 
assumption is that decentralization works by enhancing citizens’ voice in a way 
that results in improved services. 
Decentralization can strengthen accountability in two ways: between the 
center and a sub national government and within a sub national government. 
When local taxing and spending powers and central financing are well matched, 
decentralization can create checks and balances that hold sub national 
governments accountable for local services (Dehn, Reinikka, and Jakob 2003). If 
local governments are equally or less vulnerable to captured, than the center 
decentralization is likely to improve both efficiency and equity (Bardhan and 
Dilip 2002). World Banks (2002) argues that to make local governments 
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responsive to citizens, sub national governments should be assigned local tax 
instrument. Ideally, expenditures, revenue assignments, and transfers should be 
designed jointly so ends along with the freedom to set rates. That once set, 
additional demands can be met through taxes rather than grants.  
In addition to the democratization process, the slow economic recovery 
process is another circumstance that accompanied the decentralization process 
since 2001. While focus of the national government budget should be to overcome 
the crisis and maintain economic stability, at the same time national government 
budget has to dedicate some amount for new scheme of fiscal decentralization as 
mandated by Undang-Undang No. 25 year 1999. Fortunately, there were no 
significant negative effects on the national government budget created by that new 
scheme and most of local governments could understand that the relatively low 
amount of transfer is mostly due to heavy burden of national government budget 
rather than the lack of central government commitment in fiscal decentralization. 
On the other hand, the intergovernmental transfer scheme itself is still far from 
optimal due to heavy political interference especially in general allocation fund, 
natural resources revenue sharing, and tax revenue sharing. 
Local expenditure used in order to fund government matter that become 
province and regency/municipality authority consist of obligatory matter, 
selection matter, and the matter handling by certain department which can be done 
together between local government definite by the determination of Undang-
Undang. The structure of local expenditure consists of apparatuses expenditure 
and public expenditure. Public expenditure of obligatory matter fostering is 
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prioritized to keep and improve society life quality in order to perform local 
obligation that realized in a shape of basic service improvement, education, 
health, social facility, and public facility properly together with develop social 
warrant system.  
B. Hypothesis Development 
Brodjonegoro and Martinez (2002) reveal the significant negative 
correlation between the size of general allocation fund and local original revenue. 
This clearly hurts the fiscal capacity equalization purpose that should be the 
general allocation fund responsibility. The equality problem, for now, is resolved 
gradually by keeping the “rich” regions at the same level as in 2001 and at the 
same time, giving more to “poor” regions through the inflation effect of general 
allocation fund or increasing domestic revenue at national government budget. 
Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) point out; soft budget constraints 
frequently arise in settings where fiscal responsibility is ill defined. In some 
countries, there exist serious ambiguities about which level of government is 
responsible for providing certain services (such as health care or pensions) or at 
least the funding of them. Where spending and revenue authority and 
responsibility are not clearly defined, there may be good reason for governors or 
mayors to expect fiscal assistance from higher levels.  
In short, Rodden et al. (2003) find that unclear or shared responsibilities 
have a cost in terms of accountability and incentives. Moreover, it is described 
such a setting as involving transfer dependency. In order to make the tough fiscal 
decisions and weigh the benefits against the costs of new or expanded programs, 
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public officials need to be in a position of raising the monies from their 
constituencies through their own state and local tax systems. A heavy reliance on 
transfers creates incentives for turning to an expansion of these transfers rather 
than increasing taxes in one’s own jurisdiction.  
This issue actually has a long history in the literature on fiscal federalism 
where it has been called the problem of vertical fiscal imbalance. It is fairly 
general agreement that for a sound fiscal system, the various levels of government 
need their own sources of tax revenues. Proposals for additional spending need to 
be evaluated in a setting in which benefits are weighed against their costs, and 
having to rely on own revenues (rather than transfers) provides incentives for a 
more careful balancing of these two sides of the ledger. A condition of vertical 
fiscal imbalance (or transfer dependency) is said to exist where own-revenue 
systems are weak and lower level governments rely heavily on transfers from 
above. So the argument here is that having a better overall tax system if relying 
more heavily on the central government and use transfers to provide some portion 
of state and local funds. 
Purwantoro (2007) proves significant positive influence of fiscal 
decentralization in increasing original revenues and public expenditures. 
Meanwhile, Yudani (2008) find that the results of the research supported positive 
influence of implementation of fiscal decentralization through component of 
transfers and own revenues but not with other revenues component. Those 
findings lead to the following hypothesis; 
H1a: Balance fund positively influence on the local original revenue. 
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In many countries, limited formal revenue autonomy has encouraged the 
widespread use of informal revenue generating mechanisms, such as tax offsets 
and extra budgetary funds (Dabla-Norris 2006). Whether sub central 
governments’ expenditure is funded by intergovernmental grants, some revenue-
sharing program, or own-source revenue through independent taxes and user 
charges clearly makes a difference.  
Utilizing a similar panel data set, Rodden (2003) also find that 
governments tend to grow faster when sub central governments are much more 
dependent on grants. In addition, Zhuravskaya (1999) find that in spite of the 
process of decentralization in Russia Russian municipalities have never been 
independent of the regions they belong. Increase in the own revenues of the 
municipality is accompanied by decrease in “shared” revenues (share of VAT 
retained of the size of federal or regional transfers). Yudani (2008) proves that the 
results of the research supported positive influence of implementation of fiscal 
decentralization through component of transfers on own revenues but not with 
other revenues component. Based on those findings, hypothesis will be examined 
is; 
H1b: Others revenue negatively influence on the local original revenue. 
In Russia and Ukraine, however, the use of other ad hoc and non-
transparent transfers, such as mutual settlements, which accounted for over 75 per 
cent of all non-equalization transfers in Russia in 1998, provided a soft budget 
constraint environment at the sub national level. Learning from evidence in 
Russia; Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev, and Boex (2004) say that in recent year, 
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however, those have witnessed significant improvement in the design and 
implementation of intergovernmental transfers. Consistent with recent studies that 
take the distinction between different types of decentralization seriously, notably 
Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden (2003), and Stein (1999), find an asymmetric effect 
of tax revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization on government 
spending. Fiscal decentralization reflects how responsibilities for tax revenues and 
public expenditures are distributed among different tiers of government. The 
complexity of vertical government structures make this notion challenging to 
quantify. 
Indonesian case in Bali province, Yudani (2008) finds that the results of 
the research for development expenditure, only own revenue has positive 
influence on development expenditure, while transfers and others revenue has not. 
It indicated that there was dependence on receipt from central government through 
transfers in regencies/municipalities in Bali Province. Purwantoro (2007) also 
proves that significant positive influence of fiscal decentralization in increasing 
original revenues and public expenditures. Abdullah & Halim (2004) find that 
local revenue source is the local original revenue and balance fund influence to 
the local expenditure totally. Abdullah & Halim (2006) found that local revenue 
source consist of balance fund associated positively to the capital expenditure. 
Those findings lead to the hypothesis below; 
H2a: Balance fund positively influence on the public expenditure. 
Oates (2006) suggests that these grant systems have often not been 
designed properly, frequently have not functioned very well, and in some cases 
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have had perverse, if unintended, consequences. Recent studies suggest that the 
design and implementation of a multi-tier system of government can significantly 
affect overall resource allocation in the economy and, hence, economic efficiency, 
growth, and welfare (Davoodi and Zou 1998; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
2003; Akai and Sakata 2002). A central argument for fiscal decentralization 
leading to improved resource allocation rests on the assumption that fiscal 
decentralization increases local influence over the public sector. 
Apart from equalization transfers, other types of grants and transfers are 
used across the region. Matching grants for funding centrally mandated services in 
the areas of education, health or social spending are used widely in Croatia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Poland, and for investment purposes, in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2004). So, grant from central government 
must match for funding public service area in line with mandatory from central 
government. 
The study from China by Ping, Xian-Qiau, and Bai (2005) found that the 
local governments in China play the role like agent for economic development, 
but this role of agent is mainly played by local extra budgetary expenditure. The 
increase of extra budgetary revenues (fiscal incentive) with the same direction in 
increase of budgetary revenue would improve the responsiveness of public 
services in education to the real need, meaning that fiscal incentives would guide 
marginal propensity for public good provision more closely to local citizen’s 
preferences so that decentralization with fiscal revenues improved the sensitivity 
of local public good provision to local needs.  
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Evidence from Korea showed that more decentralized public sector is 
associated with a more local spending, but there is no statistically significant 
relationship between local expenditure and fiscal decentralization. The 
coefficients of income in all three equations are not statistically significant. This 
finding indicates that level of income does not affect the level of public spending 
in Korea (Kwon 2002).   
Public expenditure tracking surveys can follow the flow of funds through 
different tiers of government to determine whether they actually reach the schools 
or the clinics they are destined for. Not only highlight the uses and abuses of 
public funds, but also give insights into capture, cost efficiency, decentralization, 
and accountability (Dehn, Reinikka, and Svensson 2003). 
Evidence from Indonesia, Yudani (2008) finds that the results of the 
research supported positive influence of implementation of fiscal decentralization 
through component of transfers on own revenues but not with other revenues 
component. Other research shows that the economic growth during the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization significantly better than before the 
implementation. The other result shows that the regions with better readiness 
facing fiscal decentralization still have better economic growth during the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization (Adi 2008). Based on the previous 
findings, research hypothesis to analyze of the influence of balance fund and 
others revenue as a proxy from fiscal decentralization to the public expenditure is 
stated below; 
H2b: Others revenue positively influence on the public expenditure. 
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Government regulation  105/2000 states that budget approach that is used 
is surplus-deficit budget, which is the total amount of revenue is not equal with 
the total amount of expenditure, and there are financing component in running 
local government operational. It means that if the revenue can not cover all 
expenditure, so that can be looking for others revenue source through financing, 
such as borrowing, separated asset sold etc. Contrary, if the revenue more than 
expenditure, become surplus, so that its rest will covered in financing, for example 
to pay borrowing, shape saving fund, become current budget rest of calculation. 
Conceptually, based on government regulation 105/2000 shows that the 
changing of revenue influence to the expenditure. Although its addition revenue is 
not always all of them will be allocated into expenditure. Abdullah & Halim 
(2004) find that local revenue source is the local original revenue and balance 
fund influence to the local expenditure totally. Even though the proportion of local 
original revenue maximal only 10% from total of local revenue, its contribution to 
the budget allocation is sufficient great, mainly if it related by political interest 
(Abdullah 2004; Abdullah & Asmara 2006). While balance fund is main revenue 
source of local government (around 90-95%), but it is contingency because 
determined by central government. Abdullah & Halim (2006) find that local 
revenue source consist of balance fund associated positively to the capital 
expenditure, meanwhile Local original revenue is not. With multiple regression 
analysis, Yustikasari (2008) finds that either local original revenue variable and 
public allocation fund variable has a positive relation towards capital budget. 
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Evidence from Bulgaria revealed that minimum expenditure requirements 
for social services imposed by the central governments impinge upon the 
budgetary autonomy of local governments. In Bulgaria, municipalities have to 
fund 50 per cent of social welfare payments from their own revenue which results 
in significant disparities among municipalities in residual spending on other 
services (Mc Cullough et al. 2000).  
Freinkman and Yossifov (1998) find that fiscal decentralization is 
positively related to the share of education spending to the regional education 
spending, real industrial growth and purchasing power of population. The role of 
the local governments substantially increased since 1992 and municipalities were 
demonstrating gradually increasing share of their own municipal expenditures in 
the total regional expenditures. Regions were at the same time demonstrating 
more and more increased share of their own expenditures in the total amount of 
expenditures. However, there was very high variation of this coefficient across the 
whole country. Hence, they suggest that regions with more decentralized finances 
tend to have lower economic decline. 
The main finding of Zhuravskaya’s paper (2000) is Russian localities 
never became independent from the regional governments. Local officials have 
not been given sufficient responsibility for their decisions on expenditures and 
have not been granted the right to raise their own revenues. In his paper provides 
some evidence that revenue sharing relations between local and regional 
governments hinder local government’s incentives for providing infrastructure for 
private business development. In addition, it shows that the fiscal dependence of 
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local governments on the regions affects the distribution of public spending 
among different uses and has a negative effect on the efficiency of local public 
goods provision. 
The main results from the OLS analysis are tax revenue decentralization is 
associated with less transfers (but now only statistically significant at the 10% 
level), and expenditure decentralization is associated with increased government 
consumption. There is evidence (on the10%level of significance) that overall 
government spending increases with increasing decentralization of spending 
powers (Fiva 2006). The more autonomy local government has strong fiscal 
independence, the more economic development expenditure the government 
expenses. Main attention is paid to the effects that fiscal decentralization 
influences on the ratio of economic development expenditures and social 
development expenditures.  
Some papers examine the influence of fiscal decentralization on 
expenditure composition proposed by Mc Nab, Martinez-Vazquez, and     
Granado (2005) find strong evidence that decentralization increases the share of 
education and health expenditures in total government expenditures. They note 
that the influence of decentralization on the composition of public expenditures 
may be greater in developing countries relative to industrialized countries. Papers 
by Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) find that defense expenditure and 
infrastructure investments appear to negatively influence economic growth. 
Contemporaneous consumption-oriented public expenditures on the other hand, 
appear positively influence economic growth. Suggesting that the developing 
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countries in their data sample could increase economic growth by reallocating 
resources from military and infrastructure expenditures to consumption oriented 
expenditures. 
Sanz and Velazquez (2002) employ an augmented median voter model to 
study the determinants of expenditure composition at one single level of 
government in panel of OECD countries, they find that income, and private-public 
relative prices, institutional factors, and demographics significantly affect public 
expenditure composition. Another interesting study from the International 
Monetary Fund (2003) examined the impact of economic crises and fiscal deficits 
on social expenditures and social protection programs. The main conclusion is 
that IMF supported programs which are typically implemented as a result of 
external shocks; do not adversely impact education and health expenditures. In 
addition, Faguet (2004) examined the influence of fiscal decentralization on 
expenditure composition in Bolivia from 1991–1996. He finds evidence that fiscal 
decentralization increases investment in socially-oriented sectors, such as 
education, urban development, water and sanitation, and health care. Faguet’s 
results are suggestive of a relationship between fiscal decentralization and the 
functional composition of public expenditures. He shows that these results can be 
generalized and that they are not a reflection unique experience of a specific 
country. The result also can develop a theoretical model that can explain the 
channels through which fiscal decentralization may influence the composition of 
public expenditure.  
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Based on the previous findings, research hypothesis to analyze of the 
influence of Balance fund, others revenue and Local original revenue as a proxy 
from fiscal decentralization to the public expenditure is stated below; 
H2c: Local original revenue positively influence on the public 
expenditure. 
 
C. Conceptual Schema 
Based on the previous explanation, the conceptual schema of this research 
is stated below:  
          
         Balance fund 
 
                                                                H2a                     
        H1a  
   
        Local original                Public expenditure 
                        revenue        H2c         
                H1b 
                                                               H2b 
                                                           
 Others revenue 
 
    
 
Figure 1 
Theoretical Schema of Hypothesis Testing 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous chapter has been discussed theoretical review and hypothesis 
development. The chapter III explains related with research design, population 
and sample, data collection, variable, and analysis technique. 
 
A. Research Design 
The type of research is empirical research to test the influence balance 
fund, others revenue, and local original revenue as a proxy of fiscal 
decentralization to the public expenditure. This research is done by descriptive 
statistic analysis approach which developed from hypothesis related to the cause 
of prediction of specific situation problem. This research is run by collecting, 
processing, and presenting data for achieving a conclusion by means of generalize 
of collected data. 
 
B. Determination of Population and Sample 
Population refers to the entire group of people, events, or thinks of interest 
that the researcher wishes to investigates. Population can be explained as 
collection or numbers of people or events that are interesting to be analyzed. 
Meanwhile, sample is a part of population, which is consisted of elements having 
similar characteristics with population (Sekaran 2003). The population in this 
study is all Indonesian local government financial statement of regencies and 
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municipalities. The total population is 455 consist 369 regencies and 86 
municipalities financial statements of regencies and municipalities in year 2006. 
Sekaran (2003) divides of purposive sampling into two major types that 
are judgment sampling and quota sampling.  Judgment sampling involves the 
choice of subjects who are most advantageously placed or in the best position to 
provide the information required, meanwhile quota sampling ensures that certain 
groups are adequately represented in the study through the assignment of a quota. 
Sampling design which used in this study is purposive sampling, exactly judgment 
sampling. It is related with information readiness in the financial report which is 
having completion data. The reason of choosing the sample of regencies and 
municipalities in Indonesia is because regencies and municipalities have similar 
characteristic of economic and geographic and also the result would be expected 
give a description of general condition (Kuncoro and Ari 2005).  
The researcher collects all of information from the population which 
determination of completion data. Sample collection use judgment sampling. So 
that the sample with the completion data used in this study is 232 financial 
statements of regencies and municipalities in year 2006. The sample of 232 from 
455 populations is beyond of the standard by Rosche (1975), Krejcie and    
Morgan (1970) as well as Cohen (1969) for decision on sample size that cited on    
Sekaran (2003). According to Rosche (1975), the sample in multiple regression 
analysis minimal should be ten times of the independent variable. Additionally, 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) as well as Cohen (1969) determined the sample size 
for the research project that if the population 455 so the minimum sample 
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requirements is 210. Therefore, 232 samples have fulfilled the minimum sample 
requirement. 
 
C. Data Source and Data Collection  
The study use data which is gotten from Local Government Budget and 
others relevance of references. So, this research use published data source which 
is taken from many sources that is from Directorate general of local and central 
financial balance and also Directorate general of budget and financial balance. 
The data which will be analyzed use local government budget realization 
in a form of budget realization statement which is gotten from website 
(http://www.djpkpd.or.id 2006) in budget year 2006. The researcher takes data in 
year 2006 because of that is the most possible to obtain the real condition of 
Indonesians decentralization as a whole after five years decentralization reflected 
relate to the availability of the data.  The data would be taken are the total amount 
of local original revenue, balance fund, others revenue as a proxy of fiscal 
decentralization, and public expenditure.  
Local government that used in this study has to fulfill the criteria: (1) the 
local government in form of regency and municipality, (2) the budget realization 
statement covered the data needed in this study. The data must fulfilled data of 
local original revenue, balance fund, others revenue, and public expenditure. 
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D. Research Variable and Measurement 
1. Hypothesis 1 (H1a and H1b) 
Dependent variable in this research is local original revenue that is 
measured by the total amount of local original revenue from budget realization in 
year 2006.  
Independent variable are (1) balance fund, (2) others revenue that are 
measured by the total amount of balance fund and the total amount of others 
revenue from budget realization in year 2006. 
2. Hypothesis 2 (H2a, H2b, and H2c) 
Dependent variable in this research is public expenditure that is measured 
by the total amount of public service expenditure from budget realization in year 
2006.  
Independent variables are (1) balance fund that is measured by the total 
amount of balance fund, (2) others revenue that is measured by the total amount of 
others revenue, and (3) local original revenue that is measured by the total amount 
of local original revenue from budget realization in year 2006. 
 
E. Operational Definition of Variable 
According to the local autonomy policy with the authority decentralization and 
fiscal decentralization that conducted by Undang-Undang No. 32 year 1999 about 
local government and Undang-Undang No. 33 year 2004 about financial balance 
between central government and local explained that the source of local revenue 
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consist of local original revenue, balance fund, and others revenue. The definition 
of those variables as follow:      
1. Local original revenue is the revenue which is obtained by local government 
and collected based on local regulation in line with the laws regulation. Local 
original revenue consist of four components that is, pajak daerah (local tax), 
retribusi daerah (local retribution), pengelolaan kekayaan daerah yang 
dipisahkan (separated managed of the local resources) and lain-lain 
pendapatan asli daerah yang sah (others regional own revenues). This 
variable in line with the previous research by Purwantoro (2007),Yudani 
(2008), and Slinko (2002). 
2. Balance fund is fund which is sourced from national government budget 
revenue. It is allocated to local government to fund local needed in order to 
implementation of decentralization. Balance fund consist of share fund, 
general allocation fund, and special allocation fund. This variable in line with 
the previous research by Purwantoro (2007), Yudani (2008), and Slinko 
(2002).  
3. Others revenue consist of grant, emergency fund, tax share fund from province 
and other local government, adjustment fund and special autonomy fund, and 
financial support from province/other local government. This variable in line 
with the previous research by Purwantoro (2007) and Yudani (2008). 
4. Local Expenditure used in order to fund government matter that become 
province and regencies/municipalities authority consist of obligatory matter, 
selection matter, and the matter handling by certain department which can be 
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done together between local government definite by the determination of 
Undang-Undang. The structure of local expenditure consists of apparatuses 
expenditure and public expenditure. Public expenditure of obligatory matter 
fostering is prioritized to keep and improve society life quality in order to 
perform local obligation that realized in a shape of basic service improvement, 
education, health, social facility, and public facility properly together with 
develop social warrant system. This variable in line with the previous research 
that used by Purwantoro (2007) and Slinko (2002). 
 
F. Analysis Technique 
The framework of analysis used in this study is descriptive and analytical 
in nature. Descriptive statistics, measures of association of the data. The analysis 
of the data measures the influence of the dependent variable. Data analysis is done 
by two phases. That is (1) descriptive statistic analysis, (2) hypothesis testing 
using multiple regressions. Before running multiple regressions, the data should 
fulfill classic assumption examination which is cover normality test, 
heteroscedasticity test, autocorrelation test, and multicollinierity test.  
1. Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistic analysis will describe the data generally from the 
process of collection data to the presentation of properly data. The descriptive 
analysis consists of counting minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation from 
each data.  This analysis purposed to give the description relate to the distribution 
and data sample behavior.  
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2. Multiple regression 
The multiple regressions used to know the influence of the independent 
variable to the dependent variable. In the regression analysis, not only measure the 
power of association between two variables or more, but also show the direction 
between dependent variable and independent variable (Ghozali 2005). Multiple 
regressions will be running after fulfilling classic assumption test. The analysis is 
conducted through SPSS program by 16.00 versions. The regression model is 
employed to examine the influence of the dependent variable to the set of 
independent variables (predictor) identified in the literatures that are believed to 
have influence the dependent variable. F test is used to test the significance of all 
independent variables. The F test uses significance level of 5%. The basic 
regression model is as follows: 
1. Equation of statistical regression to examine first hypothesis is: 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + e                     (1) 
Where: 
Y = local original revenue 
a = constant 
b1 & b2 = regression coefficient 
X1 = balance fund 
X2 = others revenue 
e = estimated error. 
 
2. Equation of statistical regression to examine second hypothesis is: 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + e             (2) 
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Where:  
Y =  public expenditure 
a = constant 
b1, b2, & b3  =  regression coefficient 
X1 =  balance fund 
X2 =  others revenue 
X3 =  local original revenue 
e =  estimated error. 
 
Before running the multiple regressions, the researcher run classic 
assumption test to fulfill the qualification of regression analysis for hypothesis 
testing. So, classic assumptions test become the qualification to multiple 
regression analysis and hypothesis testing (Gujarati 2004). It is in order to ensure 
that the data analyzed is valid, consistent, and efficient on the regression 
coefficient.  According to   Ghozali (2005), the classic assumption test covered: 
a. Normality test 
The normality test functions to test whether disturbance variables or 
residual distributed normally in the regression model. The normality test used 
is One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. It functions to determine how well 
the sample of data in normality and uniformity. 
b. Heteroscedasticity test 
This test is the test to see the distribution of population points. The 
scattered test usually shows if the distribution does not form a certain shape, it 
means the population is distributed well. However, the study uses Glejser test. 
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Glejser test suggests that regressing the residual absolute value to the 
independent variable (Gujarati 2004).  
c.  Autocorrelation test 
Autocorrelation is to seek the interrupting variable or relation in the 
regression model. Kendall and Buckland (1971) cited on Gujarati (2006) 
defined the term autocorrelation as correlation between members of 
observations ordered in time (as in time-series data) or space (as in cross-
sectional data). Because of that Gujarati (2006) suggests, autocorrelation can 
occur in cross-sectional data also, in which case it is called spatial correlation. 
In this case the correlation in space rather than in time. So that the study uses 
Durbin-Watson Test and Langrange Multiplier test or Breusch-Godfrey test. 
LM test or BG test used for sample > 100 observation. This test is more 
precise than DW test particularly for big amount sample (Ghozali 2005). 
d. Multicolinearity test 
It defines the perfect linear relation between or among all independent 
variable in regression model (Gujarati 2004). The method in this test is using 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 lxxi
CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter explains about analysis results toward data which used in this 
research and analysis results discussion. 
 
A. Data Description 
The analysis targets of this study are 33 provinces in the Indonesian’s local 
governments which consist of 369 regencies and 86 municipalities 
(http://www.djpkpd.or.id) while the sample is regencies and municipalities in all 
provinces which have completed data. We analyzed data for year 2006 only. 
While a few preceding studies tried to analyze the time-series analysis focusing on 
specific events related to local governments, but in this study tries to analyze  of 
data in year 2006 by cross-section analysis. According to Undang-Undang No. 34 
year 2004 about financial balance between central government and local 
government, the relative fiscal importance between a central government and a 
local government has been kept to a steady level.  However, such analysis is 
expected to draw a significant result because there are large differences between 
inter-regions relatively. The scope of our study limited in year 2006 because it 
was the latest period available to get data and the maximum accumulation of 
experience on a local self-governing system after the implementation of Undang-
Undang No. 34 year 2004.   
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Relate to the availability data and completion data in informing all of points 
which will be needed, there are only 232 budget realization statements that 
complete all of information. The descriptive statistics analysis of variables can be 
checked in Appendix 1 and variables are broadly distributed according to regions. 
From the descriptive test result can be seen that the total data (N) taken is 232. 
The 232 data are tested to fulfill the classical assumption test; unfortunately it 
failed to fulfill the classical assumption test because of failed in heteroscedasticity 
test and autocorrelation test. The result of the classical assumption test can be seen 
in Appendix 2. Then the researcher did logarithm transformation of the 232 data. 
By using the log data, the classical assumption test is ran later. Therefore it failed 
to fulfill the classical assumption test again. Heteroscedasticity still occurred and 
data is not distributed normally.  The result of the classical assumption test using 
log data is revealed in Appendix 3. After the researcher knows that 
heteroskedasticity still exists and the distribution of data is not normal so that the 
researcher cuts of data by determining outliers. Indeed the researcher finds some 
data with extreme value. Fifty five are quitted from sample because of outliers. 
Finally, by trial and error process, in can be verified that 177 financial statement 
of regencies and municipalities as a final sample which can be tested in this study. 
These data and information are retrieved from the website 
(http://www.djpk.or.id, 2006). In addition, other data and information which are 
taken from published source or combined. Those were directly obtained by 
officers of local governments. The measurement and patterns of the local original 
revenue, balance fund, and others revenue as a proxy of fiscal decentralization, 
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and public expenditure used the total amount which taken from budget realization 
statement. The testing for the influence of fiscal decentralization to the public 
expenditure in local governments was performed by multiple regression analysis. 
Data processing and analysis were run by SPSS 16.0 for Windows and simple 
descriptive statistics were calculated using Microsoft EXCEL 2003. 
 
B. Statistical Results and Discussion 
In this subsection discuss the result of research that covered descriptive 
statistic, classical assumption test, and data analysis.  
1. Descriptive statistic 
After the completion data is sorted and the researcher did outlier data, and 
then verifies that 177 regencies and municipalities can be tested in this study. 
Descriptive statistic is derived from statistic analysis before another test 
performed using multiple regression analysis. The descriptive statistics figures of 
variables can be checked by Table 1 and variables are broadly distributed 
according to regions. From the descriptive test result, we can see that the total data 
(N) taken is 177. The minimum value, maximum value, mean, and standard 
deviation have been depicted on the table below: 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistic Result (in Million Rp) 
 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Local original 
revenue (LOR) 177 
 
   1,768.99 
 
 
160,259.23 
 
 
22,586.70 
 
 
21,353.32 
 
Balance fund (BF) 
177 
 
196,359.93 
 
 
824,822.58 
 
 
391,618.46 
 
 
132,494.65 
 
Others revenue 
(OR) 177 
 
     342.85 
 
 
501,331.83 
 
 
14,309.60 
 
 
48,716.33 
 
Public expenditure 
(PE) 177 
 
21,444.87 
 
 
480,839.68 
 
 
201,191.55 
 
 
95,558.91 
 
 
Table 1 shows the result of local original revenue in Indonesia on the 
average 22586.70 million. It means that regencies and municipalities in Indonesia 
have ability to collect their own revenue on the average Rp 22,586,700,000. While 
the mean value of balance fund is 391618.46 million. It means that regencies and 
municipalities in Indonesia achieve transfer from central government on the 
average Rp 391,618,460,000. Beside that, the other revenue obtained by regencies 
and municipalities is others revenue. It can be seen from Table 1 that the average 
of others revenue is 14309.60 million. It means that the ability of regencies and 
municipalities in Indonesia to collect their others revenue on the average Rp 
14,309,600,000. The other side, regencies and municipalities distribute their 
revenue for public expenditure in order to meet public demand. The mean value of 
public expenditure is 201191.55 million. It means that the average spending for 
public expenditure is Rp 201,191,550,000. So, it can be concluded that the 
average revenue of regencies and municipalities in Indonesia is used for public 
expenditure is around 47%. It can be counted from the sum of average local 
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original revenue, balance fund, and others revenue divided by the average of 
public expenditure. It means that 47% local government revenues use for 
financing public service needed. 
2. Classical assumption test 
By using data after outlier, then the researcher did heteroscedasticity test 
and normality test. The statistical result of the classical assumption test is revealed 
in Appendix 4. Finally, due to the heteroskedasticity still occurred then the all of 
the data could be transformed first into logarithm value. The statistical result of 
classical assumption test use data log is shown in Appendix 5. The result of 
classical assumption test after outlier and use data log will explain below: 
a. Heteroscedasticity test  
Heteroskedasticity test aims to test whether the regression has difference 
variance from the residue between observations. If this research uses the 
cross-sectional data, a heteroscedasticity problems being possible occurred. 
Therefore, the researcher does the heteroscedasticity test in this study. 
The result of Glejser test shows that there are no heteroskedasticity. It 
means that heteroskedasticity does not exist on the regression model.  
b. Normality test 
The purpose of normality test is to know whether or not residual has a 
normal distribution in the regression model (Ghozali 2005). The appendix 5 
reveals that the distribution of the data is normal. It can be seen from 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 1.333 with p-value 0.057. Therefore, because of       
p-value > 0.05 it can be said that the data normally distributed. 
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c. Multicollinearity test 
The assumption of multicollinearity is not exist according to Gujarati 
(2004) happened when there is no exact linear relationship among independent 
variables, or there is no multicollinearity if more than one exact linear 
relationship is involved, is new and needs some explanation. The calculation 
results of tolerance value show up that none of independent variables have 
tolerance value < 0.10. It means no correlation among independent variables 
which have value > 95%. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shows that none of 
independent variables have VIF > 10. So, it can be concluded that there is no 
multicollinearity. 
d. Autocorrelation test 
Autocorrelation is to seek the interrupting variable or relation in the 
regression model. Autocorrelation test aims to test whether or not the 
correlation happens in regression model. It can be known by Durbin-Watson 
test or Lagrange Multiplier test (Breusch-Godfrey test). BG uses criteria that if 
parameter coefficient for lag residual shows the probability of significance > 
5% means autocorrelation is not exist (Ghozali 2006). There is no 
autocorrelation by LM test or BG test due to the Lag_Res has significance 
level > 0.05 and by Durbin Watson (1.913) is seen from du = 1.74 and 4 – du 
= 2.26. Because of (du) 1.74 < Durbin-Watson 1.609 < (4 - du) 2.26 then it 
can be concluded that there are no autocorrelation. 
After the data fulfill the classical assumption test that there is no 
heteroscedasticity, data normally distributed, no multicollinearity, and no 
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autocorrelation; then the researcher run the regression analysis as on the next 
subsection. 
3. Data analysis and discussion  
By using data log, it can be proved that all of classical assumption has 
been fulfilled, and then the test of hypothesis could be done. Hypothesis testing 
was done through multiple regressions. Multiple regression done by measuring 
goodness of fit test model to measure the appropriateness of sample regression 
functions in predicting actual value. Regression model goodness of fit could be 
seen from determination coefficient, F-value, and t-value. 
a. Statistical analysis of the first hypothesis 
The purpose of the first step is to test the influence between the 
independent variable (balance fund and others revenue) to the dependent 
variable (local original revenue). Multiple regressions will be done 
simultaneously toward all independent variable with significance level 0.05. 
Due to the using data log, then the empirical model is formulated in the 
following regression equation: 
Log LOR = a + b1 Log BF + b2 Log OR + e          (3) 
The result of regression test and the result of regression model are revealed on 
Table 2 below; 
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Table 2 
Regression Test and Model (Enter Regression Method) 
 
Variabel     Coefficient       Std.Error  t  Sig 
 
Constant         -2.325          .974        -2.386   .018 
Log BF           1.197          .179          6.681   .000 (H1a)  
Log OR           -.037          .047          -.796   .427 (H1b) 
  
R²    .206 
Adjusted R²   .197 
F-value          22.576 
Sig    .000 
        
*Significant level 0.05 
 Dependent variable = Local Original Revenue 
Based on the data execution on the table 2, it can be verified that the 
formulation is follow: 
Log LOR = -2.325 + 1.197 Log BF – 0.037 Log OR         (4) 
Determination coefficient (R²) is measured how far the independent variables 
can explain the dependent variable. The Table 2 revealed that the value of 
adjusted R square is 0.197 which means that 19.7% variation local original 
revenue (dependent variable) can be explained by the variation from the 
combination of independent variables that is others revenue and balance fund. 
The rest of 80.3% explained by the others factors outside of the model.  
 The F-value is used to decide whether the regression model could be 
used to predict the dependent variable. Based on the empirical results of the F 
test, it can be seen that the F-value is 22.576 with the significance probability 
0.000. The regression model can be used to predict local original revenue 
because of the probability < 0.05. It means that the independent variables of 
the research influence the dependent variable. Therefore, balance fund and 
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others revenue at the moment influence on the local original revenue. Based 
on the result of regression test on Table 2, it can be seen on the following 
discussion:  
1) Hypothesis 1a stated that balance fund positively influence on the local 
original revenue.  Relate to the result of the regression test, it proved that 
H1a supported by the finding of the research results that is the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization through component of balance 
fund positively influence on the increasing local original revenue. 
The result of the hypothesis testing shows that balance fund significantly 
influences on the local original revenue. It can be seen that the p-value 
0.000 in the significance level 0.05. Regression coefficient of balance fund 
1.197 indicates that each addition of balance fund at the amount of 10 (in 
million) will increase local original revenue 1.197 (in million rupiahs). 
Coefficient is positive that it reflects the positive relation between balance 
fund and local original revenue. It means that balance fund affect to the 
increasing of the local original revenue. It can be said that the increasing 
of balance fund is followed by the increasing of local original revenue. In 
other word, local original revenue will increase if balance fund is increase.  
It indicates that local government in Indonesia strongest dependent on the 
balance fund to increase their own revenue. It reveals that local 
government reliance on central government fund through balance fund to 
enhance local revenue. This result is consistent with the previous study 
that is Purwantoro (2007) and Yudani (2008). Therefore, it can be 
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concluded that both of balance fund and others revenue affect the local 
original revenue.  
2) Hypothesis 1b stated that others revenue negatively influence on the local 
original revenue. The result of the regression test can be said that H1b is not 
supported by the finding of the research results because of the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization through others revenue 
component is not affect significantly on the increasing local original 
revenue. 
It can be seen on Table 2 reveals that others revenue is not influence 
significantly on the local original revenue because of the p-value > 0.05. 
Others revenue regression coefficient shows –0.037 informs that each 
addition of others revenue at the amount of 10 (in million) will decrease 
local original revenue 0.037 (in million rupiahs). Coefficient of others 
revenue is negative that it reflects the negative relation between others 
revenue and local original revenue. It means that others revenue is not 
affect to the increasing of the local original revenue.  
Although the hypothesis is not supported by this result, but the finding of 
this result is in line with the previous study that is Yudani (2008) and 
Zhuravskaya (1999). 
In sum, it can be concluded that balance fund together with others 
revenue influence on the local original revenue. Meanwhile, balance fund is 
statistically strongest variable affects to the local original revenue even though 
others revenue is not affect significantly. Transfer from central government 
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through balance fund hoped that regencies and municipalities in Indonesia can 
be independently and do not depending on central government by building up 
local original revenue. Therefore, regencies and municipalities have to effort 
by improving their own revenue in line with the spirit of local autonomy.  
b. Statistical analysis of the second hypothesis        
The purpose of the second step is to test the influence between the 
independent variable (balance fund, others revenue, and local original 
revenue) to the dependent variable (public expenditure). Multiple regressions 
will be done simultaneously toward all independent variable with significance 
level 0.05. Due to the using data log, then the empirical model is formulated in 
the following regression equation: 
Log LOR = a + b1 Log BF + b2 Log OR + b3 Log LOR + e        (5)  
The result of regression test and the result of regression model are depicted on 
Table 3.  
Table 3 
Regression Test and Model (Enter Regression Method) 
 
Variabel         Coefficient       Std.Error    t  Sig 
 
Constant  .275  . 509    .540               .590     
Log BF      .807  .103  7.811      .000 (H2a)    
Log OR     .034  .024  1.408    .161 (H2b)    
Log LOR  .086  .039  2.203  .029 (H2c) 
 
R²    .400 
Adjusted R²  .389 
F-value          38.380 
Sig    .000 
        
*Significant level 0.05 
 Dependent variable = Public Expenditure 
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Based on the data execution on the table 3, it can be verified that the 
formulation is follow: 
Log PE = 0.275 + 0.807 BF + 0.034 OR + 0.086 Log LOR        (6) 
It can be seen that the value of adjusted R square is 0.389 which means that 
38.9% variation public expenditure (dependent variable) can be explained by 
the variation from independent variables that is balance fund, others revenue, 
and local original revenue. The rest of 61.1% explained by the others factors 
outside of the model.  
Table 3 shows that the F-value is 38.380 with the significance 
probability 0.000. It can be seen that significance probability less than 0.05. 
Hence, the regression model can be used to predict public expenditure because 
of the p-value < 0.05. It means that balance fund, others revenue and local 
original revenue simultaneously influence on the public expenditure. 
The empirical results on Table 3 can be concluded that all of the independent 
variables (balance fund, others revenue, and local original revenue) affect to 
the public expenditure.  
Based on the result of regression test on Table 3, it can be seen on the 
following discussion:  
1)  Hypothesis 2a sated that balance fund positively influence on the public 
expenditure.  Relate to the result of the regression test, it can be said that 
H2a supported by the finding of the research results that is the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization through component of balance 
fund positively influence on the public expenditure. 
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On the Table 3 reveals the individual parameter significance which it 
shows each of the dependent variable affect to the independent variable. 
The significance probability of balance fund is 0.000. It means that public 
expenditure significantly influenced by balance fund. It can be seen that 
the significance probability < 0.05. Beside that, the regression coefficient 
of balance fund 0.807 indicates that each addition of balance fund 10 (in 
million) will increase public expenditure 0.807 (in million Rp). The 
coefficient value is positive that it reflects the positive relation between 
balance fund with the public expenditure. It means that of balance fund 
affect to the increasing of public expenditure.  
 It can be said that if balance fund increase then public expenditure 
increase too. It means that regencies and municipalities in Indonesia 
allocate their revenue for public expenditure along with the increasing of 
balance fund. This is in line with the previous study by Purwantoro (2007), 
Abdullah & Halim (2004) and Kuncoro (2007).  
Therefore, balance fund positively influence on the public expenditure. It 
indicated that there is dependence on receipt from central government 
through transfers in regencies/municipalities in Indonesia. 
2) Hypothesis 2b stated that others revenue positively influence on the public 
expenditure. The result of the regression test can be said that H2b is not 
supported by the finding of the research results that is the implementation 
of fiscal decentralization through component of others revenue does not 
positively influence on the public expenditure. 
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It can be seen that the significance probability of others revenue is 0.161.  
It means that others revenue does not significantly affect to the public 
expenditure because of the significance probability > 0.05. Others revenue 
regression coefficient shows 0.034 inform that each addition of others 
revenue 10 (in million) will increase public expenditure 0.034 (in million 
rupiahs). So, it can be said that if others revenue are increase then public 
expenditure is increase too.  
Although the hypothesis is not supported by this result, but the finding of 
this result is consistent with the previous study by Ping et al. (2005) and 
Yudani (2008).  
3) Hypothesis 2c stated that local original revenue positively influence on the 
public expenditure. According to the result of the regression test, it can be 
said that H2c supported by the finding of the research results that is the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization through component of local 
original revenue positively influence on the public expenditure. 
The significance probability of local original revenue is 0.029.  It means 
that public expenditure significantly influenced by local original revenue. 
It can be seen that the significance probability < 0.05. Beside that, the 
coefficient value is positive that it reflects the positive relation between, 
local original revenue with the public expenditure. It means that local 
original revenue affect to the increasing of public expenditure. 
Regression coefficient of local original revenue 0.086 informs that each 
addition of local original revenue 10 (in million) will increase public 
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expenditure 0.086 (in million rupiahs). So, it can be said that if local 
original revenue increase then public expenditure increase too. It means 
that regencies and municipalities in Indonesia allocate their revenue for 
public expenditure along with the increasing of their own revenue. So that 
local original revenue positively influence on the public expenditure.  
This is in line with the previous studies by Freinkman and Yossifov 
(1998), Zhuravskaya (2000), Fiva (2006, Mc Nab et al. (2005), Faguet 
(2004), and Abdullah & Halim (2004). 
In sum, the result of the hypothesis testing shows that all of balance 
fund, others revenue, and local original revenue simultaneously influence on 
the public expenditure. The other side from the individual parameter 
significance, local original revenue and balance fund significantly influence 
on the public expenditure even though others revenue is not influence. So, 
local original revenue and balance fund are statistically strong variable affects 
to the public expenditure although others revenue is not. It indicated that the 
large amount of revenue obtained by regencies and municipalities will be 
followed by public expenditure. Therefore, transfer from central government 
through balance fund truly importance for regencies and municipalities in 
Indonesia to improve public service demand.  
It can be concluded that the fiscal decentralization through the proxy of 
local original revenue, balance fund, and others revenue totally influence on 
the public expenditure. The increase of revenues (fiscal revenues) with the 
same direction in increase of budgetary revenue would improve the 
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responsiveness of public services demand to the real need, meaning that fiscal 
decentralization would guide marginal propensity for public good provision 
more closely to local citizen’s preferences so that decentralization with fiscal 
revenues improved the sensitivity of local public good provision to local 
needs.  
Hence, the more autonomy local government has strong fiscal 
independence, the more public expenditure or the lower its preference for 
social welfare development. Public expenditures in local governments are 
directly proportional to the size of the financial power. Rather, it could be 
assumed that the fiscal decentralization level is proportional to the public 
expenditure in Indonesia.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
A. Conclusion 
From the descriptive statistical results, it can be concluded that the average 
of revenue of regencies and municipalities in Indonesia used for financing public 
expenditure is 47%.  
Statistically, balance fund is significantly affects to the local original 
revenue although others revenue is not affect significantly. So, the increasing of 
balance fund is followed by the increasing of local original revenue. Therefore, 
regencies and municipalities have to effort by improving their own revenue in line 
with the spirit of local autonomy. This result is line with the previous study by 
Zhuravskaya (1999), Purwantoro (2007), and Yudani (2008).  
For the public expenditure, it can be concluded that the fiscal 
decentralization through the proxy of local original revenue, balance fund, and 
others revenue simultaneously influence on the public expenditure. Indeed, 
balance fund; others revenue; and local original revenue positively influence on 
the public expenditure although both of balance fund and local original revenue 
significantly affect to the public expenditure while others revenue does not 
significantly affect. So, the second hypothesis is proved. The result of this study in 
line with the previous studies by Freinkman and Yossivof (1998), Zhuravskaya 
(2000), Faguet (2004), Abdullah and Halim (2004), Ping et al. (2005), Mc Nab et 
al. (2005), Fiva (2006), Kuncoro (2007), Purwantoro (2007), and Yudani (2008). 
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The increasing of revenues (fiscal revenues) with the same direction in 
increase of budgetary revenue would improve the responsiveness of public 
services demand to the real need, meaning that fiscal decentralization would guide 
marginal propensity for public good provision more closely to local citizen’s 
preferences so that decentralization with fiscal revenues improved the sensitivity 
of local public good provision to local needs.  
 
B. Limitation and Recommendation 
The conclusions to be derived from our analysis must be tempered by the 
study’s inherent limitations. The primary limitation is the investigation of local 
budget realization just for a single budget year rather than over several years. The 
researcher chose to limit its investigation to cross-sectional analysis because of the 
availability and completed data. These findings, no matter how statistically 
significant, would therefore have to be validated by time-series analysis. 
Secondly, the independent variables that the researcher incorporated into 
the model may be inadequate surrogates for the underlying conditions or 
circumstances that are intended to represent. For example, political competition, 
change in population, may influence on the fiscal instability.  
A third limitation is confining the study to the local government in 
Indonesia. The budget practices of local government will undoubtedly be 
influenced by the political, ethical, demographic factor and economic factors that 
differ from regency to regency and which are not captured by this study.  
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In accordance with the local finance theory, fiscal decentralization can 
contribute to the demand of public service development from society on a 
dynamic aspect. Means that the government must control their revenue for public 
service spending rather than apparatus spending in order to fulfill public 
accountability and also support public demand. These opinions could be verified 
by this study.  
The conclusions have implications for the theory of decentralization: shifts 
in expenditures towards higher decentralization will not achieve the expected 
benefits without a concurrent shift in control towards localities over how much 
revenue local governments can collect. A decentralized system is expected to be 
better respond to the local preferences needs and to promote competition among 
local units in the provision of public goods and services. Additionally this 
research has implications for the budgetary policy. 
Future research should be followed by utilizing the latest data and 
information which are accumulated since 2006 for the better understanding of the 
detailed policy effects of fiscal decentralization. At the same time, the effects of 
fiscal decentralization on more specific spending of local self-governing entities 
need to be assessed. 
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